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Abstract—The ubiquitous nature of the IoT devices has
brought serious security implications to its users. A lot of
consumer IoT devices have little to no security implementation
at all, thus risking user’s privacy and making them target of
mass cyber-attacks. Indeed, recent outbreak of Mirai botnet and
its variants have already proved the lack of security on the
IoT world. Hence, it is important to understand the security
issues and attack vectors in the IoT domain. Though significant
research has been done to secure traditional computing systems,
little focus was given to the IoT realm. In this work, we reduce
this gap by developing a honeypot framework for IoT devices.
Specifically, we introduce U-PoT: a novel honeypot framework
for capturing attacks on IoT devices that use Universal Plug and
Play (UPnP) protocol. A myriad of smart home devices including
smart switches, smart bulbs, surveillance cameras, smart hubs,
etc. uses the UPnP protocol. Indeed, a simple search on Shodan
IoT search engine lists 1,676,591 UPnP devices that are exposed to
public network. The popularity and ubiquitous nature of UPnP-
based IoT device necessitates a full-fledged IoT honeypot system
for UPnP devices. Our novel framework automatically creates
a honeypot from UPnP device description documents and is
extendable to any device types or vendors that use UPnP for
communication. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
work towards a flexible and configurable honeypot framework
for UPnP-based IoT devices. We released U-PoT under an open
source license for further research on IoT security and created
a database of UPnP device descriptions. We also evaluated our
framework on two emulated deices. Our experiments show that
the emulated devices are able to mimic the behavior of a real IoT
device and trick vendor-provided device management applications
or popular IoT search engines while having minimal performance
ovherhead.
Keywords—iot honeypot, threat detection, system security.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the use of IoT devices has increased
to a great extent. Increased application of smart wearables,
home improvement systems etc. connected more users to the
Internet. Indeed, by 2020, Internet connected devices will
rapidly grow from 5 billion to 24 billion [12]. Securing this
huge network of connected devices has already become a prime
concern due to several existing attacks of botnets like Mirai
[3] and its variants Qbot [14], Okiru [4], etc. Most of the IoT
devices are wireless connected making them an easy target of
eavesdropping. Having low computing resources, these devices
cannot implement a complex security scheme thus making
them a prime target of malicious users. Furthermore, not all
users are well-versed about security issues and tend to keep
the default usernames and passwords for their devices, thus
making an attack easier for a hacker. In fact, this was the main
reason how the Mirai botnet [3] was powered by a list of 62
default usernames and passwords and was able to bring down
some of the popular websites and major part of the Internet
infrastructure.
In the IoT ecosystem, a significant number of the IoT de-
vices use Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) protocol to commu-
nicate. According to a research [13], some 6900 network-aware
products from 1500 companies at 81 million IP-addresses
responded to their UPnP discovery requests. 20% of those 81
million systems also exposed a Simple Object Access Protocol
(SOAP) API to the Internet providing an easy entry point to
malicious attackers. The same research has also pointed out
many vulnerabilities in the UPnP device SDK. Although some
of those vulnerabilities are patched, some are still at large and
with a new patch, there is chance to add new vulnerabilities.
Another UPnP scanner built using ZMap [7] network scanner
found 3.4 million UPnP devices with known vulnerabilities. As
of this writing, Shodan IoT search engine has listed around
1,676,591 publicly exposed UPnP devices. Therefore, it is
very important to develop a cost-efficient method to identify
vulnerabilities in UPnP-based IoT devices. Honeypots are very
promising in this direction as they have been proven useful
[6] for disclosing and analyzing these vulnerabilities without
exposing critical assets.
Today, there are so many honeypot implementation for
traditional computing systems, but very few for IoT devices
and none for the UPnP devices. Due to heterogeneous nature
of IoT devices, it is very difficult to have an IoT honeypot that
covers a wide range of devices. In this paper, we solved this
problem by emulating the entire IoT platform. We introduce
a novel honeypot framework called U-PoT to create emulated
honeypot device for UPnP-based IoT devices. U-PoT is agnos-
tic of device type or vendor, flexible and easily configurable
for any UPnP-based devices.
Contributions: In this work, we focus on the development of
an interactive emulated IoT device that uses UPnP protocol.
Utilizing the device description document of the UPnP devices,
we developed an open-source, flexible, configurable, and in-
teractive honeypot platform for UPnP-based IoT devices. In
summary, our contributions include:
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• a novel framework to automatically create an emu-
lated UPnP device from a UPnP device description
document.
• an emulated version of a smart switch that uses UPnP
protocol for communication.
• evaluation of our framework in different test scenarios.
• creation of an open source database of UPnP descrip-
tions for variety of devices.
• and finally, in support of open science, the U-PoT
framework is made available1to research community
under an open-source license.
Organization: The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
Section II discusses the related work. Section III gives some
background on honeypots; Section IV explains UPnP device
architecture. U-PoT famework architectural design is explained
in Section V. Section VI shows experimental setup and evalu-
ation and we conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Research on honeypot technologies has been introduced at
the end of 1990s and since then, it has evolved. Significant
research work has been put to resolve new security threats
and vulnerabilities. Honeyd [19] is a popular virtual honey-
pot framework to simulate computer systems at the network
level. It simulates the TCP/IP stack of an operating system
and supports TCP, UDP, and ICMP protocols. To match the
network behavior of the configured operating system, honeyd’s
personality engine modifies the response packet before sending
a response for incoming requests. Nepenthes [5] honeypot
platform emulates only the vulnerable parts of a service.
Though significant research was done on honeypot tech-
nologies for traditional computing systems, there is little work
done for IoT honeypots. To the best of our knowledge, the
first IoT honeypot was introduced by IoTPOT [17], a low-
interaction honeypot for Telnet protocol. Other Telnet and
SSH based honeypots [18], [21], [23] are also common for
the IoT domain. However, these honeypots are low-interaction
and do not represent an actual IoT device behavior. They
simulate only a part of the network sub-system and face
difficulty in engaging user in an interactive session to capture
useful information. ThingPot [24] is the first low-interaction
honeypot to emulate the Philips Hue smart lighting system,
but it is not easily extendable to other devices. SIPHON [10]
solved the problem of low-interaction honeypot by deploying
80 high-interactive devices with a diverse set of IPs located
in different geographical areas by using only seven real IoT
devices. This setup helps to engage users for longer sessions,
but it is expensive and the cost increases with increased number
of physical devices. A new concept of intelligent interaction
honeypot was introduced by IoTCandyJar [12] which emulates
the request-response pattern of an IoT device. It collects a
seed database of IoT request extracted using a low-interaction
honeypot and probes online IoT devices to receive response for
those requests. It uses machine learning to deduce response for
unknown requests and update the database with newly deduced
1U-PoT project for download: https://github.com/azizulhakim/u-pot/
knowledge. However, this approach is highly dependent on
the initial seed request. So a malicious attacker can create
fake devices and deploy large number of those fake devices
to manipulate the operation of it. All these honeypots are
server honeypots that expose server services and wait to be
attacked. On the other hand, client honeypots [1], [2], [15], [20]
are different types of honeypots to detect malicious servers.
In this work, we keep our focus on server honeypots only.
We developed a novel framework for automatically creating
interactive honeypot for IoT devices that use UPnP as their
communication protocol.
Difference from the existing work: U-PoT solves the problem
of existing low-interaction honeypots while providing the ad-
vantages of high-interaction honeypots. It is agnostic of device
type or vendor, flexible, and easily configurable for any UPnP-
based devices. Operation of U-PoT is not dependent on any
initial seed requests and hence, it solves the problem possessed
by IoTCandyJar. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work to focus on the interactive nature of IoT devices
to provide a cost-effective, flexible and configurable honeypot
framework for UPnP-based IoT devices.
III. BACKGROUND
Honeypot is a very instrumental tool widely used in iden-
tifying and analyzing unknown attack vectors. Generally, it
is deployed in a controlled environment to attract attackers.
From the attacker’s perspective, a honeypot appears just like
any regular system, but in reality, the interactions between the
attacker and the honeypot are closely monitored and collected
for further analysis by researchers. This helps researchers to
discover new vulnerabilities in a system and identify appropri-
ate mitigation techniques.
Honeypots are traditionally classified into two categories
based on their interaction level: low-interaction and high-
interaction. Low-Interaction Honeypots: A low-interaction
honeypot is an emulated service that gives attackers very
limited level of interaction. Most of the time, these honeypots
are just a collection of network service implementations like
Telnet, SSH etc. They are lightweight by design and can be
developed in less time and deployed in large scale. Because
of the limited interaction provided by them, they can col-
lect only limited information and are easily identifiable by
an intelligent attacker. High-Interaction Honeypots: A high-
interaction honeypot tends to provide a full-fledged system. An
attacker can interact with a real system and has access to all
system functionality that a normal user has access to. They are
not easily detectable and can collect more information about
the attacker. They are complex and costly to implement and
deploy.
Low-interaction honeypots only support a few features of a
system rather than supporting the entire system behavior. They
are not interactive and fail to engage users for a longer session.
Vulnerabilities on IoT devices are usually highly dependent on
specific device brand or even firmware version. This leads to
the fact that attackers tend to perform several checks on the
remote host to gather more device information before launch-
ing the exploit-code. Limited level of interaction provided by a
low-interaction honeypot is not enough to pass the check and
fail to capture real attack [12]. This problem can be solved
by deploying high-interactive IoT devices, but that would be
costly. In fact, there are medium-interaction honeypots that
are built with the help of full system virtualization. In this
approach, a researcher takes the system image for a target
system and deploys it in a virtual environment to emulate
the real behavior of a physical device. Unfortunately, access
to system images for popular IoT devices are limited. In
this paper, we overcome these problems by introducing an
emulated IoT device (i.e., smart bulb) and showed how it can
be used as a replacement for a full system virtualization-based
honeypot.
In our system, we selected IoT devices that use UPnP
protocol for communication. The rationale for this selection
stems from the fact that UPnP is widely deployed on a lot
of IoT devices and enormous discussion has been made by
researchers about its security issues. Having a honeypot tool
targeted to UPnP device class will help researchers to deploy
the same tool for a large variants of devices and vendors to
fight against vulnerabilities in the IoT domain.
IV. UPNP DEVICE ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we present a short description on the archi-
tecture of a UPnP device and their communication mechanisms
as this will help to understand the implementation of the
U-PoT framework. Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) device
architecture [8] is an extension to plug and play technology
for networked devices. UPnP technology leverages Internet
protocols such as IP, TCP, UDP, HTTP and XML to support
zero-configuration, ”invisible” networking, and automatic dis-
covery for a breadth of device categories from a wide range
of vendors. Every UPnP device is defined by an XML-based
device schema for the purpose of enabling device-to-device
interoperability in a scalable, networked environment.
UPnP devices can be classified in two categories: controlled
devices and control points. Controlled devices act as a server
which is responsible for delivering a service. For example,
a smart switch is a controlled device that implements some
service and exposes them to home users to on/off the switch,
set rules, update configuration etc. Generally a home user takes
advantage of those services using a mobile application (e.g.,
a smartphone app) which is referred to as a control point in
the UPnP context. Furthermore, UPnP stack consists of the
following layers.
A. Discovery Layer
Discovery is the first step in UPnP networking. The dis-
covery protocol allows a device to advertise its service to
other devices on the network or allow other devices to search
for an UPnP device on the network. The discovery message
contains some essential specifics of the device including a
pointer to more detailed information of the device. When a
new device joins the network, it may multicast a discovery
message searching for an interesting device. An UPnP device
must listen to the standard multicast address and must respond
if the search criteria in the discovery message matches with
itself. UPnP devices use Simple Service Discovery Protocols
(SSDP) for device discovery or advertisement. When a control
point (e.g., a smartphone app) desires to search the network for
a device, it sends a multicast request with M-SEARCH method
on the reserved address and port (239.255.255.250:1900). The
format of the M-SEARCH message is shown in Figure 1.
An UPnP device responds to a discovery message with some
basic information of the device which includes UPnP type,
universally-unique identifier, and a URL to the device’s UPnP
description.
M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
HOST: 239.255.255.250:1900
MAN: "ssdp:discover"
MX: seconds to delay response
ST: search target
USER-AGENT: optional field
Fig. 1: M-SEARCH Request Format.
B. Description Layer
After discovering a device, the control point has very little
information about the device. To interact with the device, the
control point has to retrieve a description of the device and
its capabilities from the URL provided by the device in the
discovery message. This UPnP device description is an XML
formatted data partitioned into two logical parts: a device
description describing the physical and logical containers, and
service descriptions describing the capabilities exposed by the
device. Figure 2 shows the description architecture of a UPnP
device. The description includes vendor specific information.
For each service in the device, the device description lists the
service type, service name, a URL for the service description,
a URL for control, and a URL for eventing.
The UPnP description for a service defines actions that
are accessible by a control point and their arguments. It also
defines a list of state variables and their data type, range,
and event characteristics. The state variable represents device
state in a given time. Each service associates with one or
Fig. 2: UPnP Description Architecture.
more action. Each action has input and output arguments.
Each argument corresponds to one of the state variables. A
single physical device may include multiple logical devices.
The device description also includes the description of all the
embedded devices and one or more URL for presentation. The
control point issues HTTP GET request to get a specific URL.
C. Control & Eventing Layers
Once the control point has information about the UPnP
device and its services, it can invoke actions from those
services and receive a response. To invoke an action, the
control panel sends a control message to the fully qualified
control URL for the service. The service returns result or
error in response. Events are published to all interested control
points if the effect of the action makes change to the state
variable of that service.
D. Presentation Layer
If a device has a URL for presentation, then the control
point can retrieve a page from this URL, load the page into a
browser and depending on the capabilities of the page, allow
a user to control the device and/or view device status.
V. U-POT DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present the implementation of the U-
PoT framework. A schematic view of the system architecture
is shown in Figure 3. We start by outlining our choice of IoT
devices and the protocols they use and then present the proof-
of-concept design of the system.
A. Target Device
In this sub-section we introduce our selection of target
device, a real UPnP-based IoT device whose device description
is used for the implementation of the U-PoT framework. For
the implementation of U-PoT, we selected Belkin Wemo smart
switch [11]. The rationale for this selection stems from the
fact that, smart switches are the most common IoT devices
and are widely used in smart home settings. Before going into
implementation details, we introduce a short description about
the working principles of the device.
Fig. 3: U-PoT system architecture. U-PoT is availabe for
download at https://github.com/azizulhakim/u-pot as an open-
source project
Belkin Wemo Smart Switch is a UPnP protocol-based
device that uses SOAP messaging specification for exchanging
structured information. It has 12 services implemented in its
firmware. Each service has one or more action for control
and event subscription. Using a control application, a user
can invoke an action from these services to manipulate device
states, add rules, update firmware, etc. It also hosts some
image and HTML files for presentation. The control point
is an Android or iOS application that uses SSDP discovery
request to discover the device on the network. When the
application starts, it issues M-SEARCH command on the
multicast address 239.255.255.250:1900. Figure 4 shows the
attributes of the M-SEARCH command issued by U-PoT to
discover target device’s information. As noted earlier, any
UPnP device listening to this multicast address will respond to
the M-SEARCH request with its information. In the U-PoT’s
case, the target device responds with its UPnP type, unique
identifier, and a URL to its UPnP description XML file as
in Figure 5. The control application parses the XML file to
extract more information about the device and displays the
relevant information.
M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
HOST: 239.255.255.250:1900
MAN: "ssdp:discover"
MX: 2
ST: upnp:rootdevice
Fig. 4: M-SEARCH Request for Target Device.
((’10.0.0.11’,49153),’HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Location: 10.0.0.11:49153/setup.xml
Cache-Control: max-age=1800
Server: Unspecified, UPnP/1.0
uuid:XXXXXXXXXXXXXX::upnp:rootdevice’)
Fig. 5: M-SEARCH Response from WeMo Switch.
B. State Scanner
U-PoT state scanner is responsible for extracting the de-
scription layer of a UPnP enabled device. UPnP description
layer is an XML definition of the device that describes the de-
vice capabilities. It contains device configuration information
and different service descriptions. Please refer to IV-B for more
information about the description layer of an UPnP device.
The state scanner issues a multicast M-SEARCH command
on 239.255.255.250:1900 to discover available UPnP devices
on the network. The response to M-SEARCH request contains
device UUID and an URL to the device description file
as shown in Figure 5. The URL contains the UPnP root
description XML and works as an entry point to the description
layer of the device. Once state scanner retrieves the entry point,
the remaining work is done in two steps.
Crawling: A UPnP device might host multiple service de-
scriptor XML files defining the Control & Eventing Layer and
some image or HTML file for the Presentation Layer. U-PoT
state scanner parses the root description to extract the URLs to
those resources. Once the paths are extracted, it starts crawling
those URLs using HTTP Get method and store them in local
file system. The crawled files are later hosted from the U-
PoT emulated device. Each UPnP service descriptor defines
multiple actions and action arguments that are accessible by
a control point. It also defines a list of state variable which
represents the device state in a given time. The crawler parses
the service descriptor XML to generate a curated list of state
variables, actions and action arguments. This list is later used
by the U-PoT emulated device to represent the runtime state
of the emulated device.
Scanning: After crawling all description and presentation layer
information, U-PoT enters into the scanning state. During
the scanning state, U-PoT tries to create a snapshot of a
valid start point for the emulated device. Having a valid start
point is important for the emulated device as without it the
emulated device might fail to establish the initial handshaking
communication with a genuine control point. To create a valid
snapshot, U-PoT invokes the actions from each service it
extracted during the crawling step. From the device context, an
action is a function that can be invoked by a client to set the
value of a state variable or get the value of a state variable.
The U-PoT state scanner gets the value of a state variable
by formulating a SOAP request which it uses to invoke a get
action and retrieves its value from the response. Finally, it
updates the state variable database using the value received.
This database represents a valid snapshot of our target device
and can be used to initialize an emulated U-PoT device.
The IoT device and the service descriptions are written
by device vendors and is usually based on a standard UPnP
Device/Service Template. As the device and service descrip-
tions are created from a generic template and all UPnP device
vendors follow these templates to create the descriptions for
their device, U-PoT state scanner is vendor-agnostic and usable
to automatically extract information from any UPnP device
from any vendor.
C. U-PoT Device
The last step to build the U-PoT honeypot framework is
to create the emulated device that can listen to incoming
requests and return/update its state accordingly. Similar to
a regular UPnP device, the U-PoT device should work on
two different modes. In the discovery mode, U-PoT devices
should respond with device information and device state that
is extracted using the scanner. In the normal operation mode,
they should respond to incoming requests to change device
state or notify device state. The U-PoT framework achieves
this by using the gupnp [9] library from the GNOME project.
This library handles the initialization of a UPnP device, hosting
device description files and other static resources, responding
to SSDP discovery requests, and serialize/deserialize SOAP
requests. Initially, U-PoT generates gupnp compatible code for
a skeleton UPnP device and initializes service and presentation
layer using the service and presentation descriptor XMLs
extracted during scanning state. Next the U-PoT framework
adds action handlers for different actions, that could be invoked
by a control point. An action can be a request to read a state
variable or a request to write new value to a state variable. For
example, a control point might want to know whether a smart
Fig. 6: Generation of U-PoT Device Callback from Action.
switch is turned on/off or might want to turn on/off a switch.
Trying to turn on/off the switch invokes an action to write new
value on the corresponding state variable. Similarly, trying to
know whether a switch is on/off invokes an action to read
corresponding state variable. U-PoT automatically generates
an empty function block for each action. Next it adds body of
the function by using the input-output parameters extracted by
State Scanner for each action. If the action corresponds to a
state read request, U-PoT will reference the state variable to
retrieve the value of the variable and create SOAP response.
Figure 6 shows how U-PoT maps an UPnP action to U-PoT
callback function for a read request. On the other hand, for a
write request, U-PoT extracts the value of the incoming state
variables from the incoming SOAP message and updates the
corresponding variables in state variable database. This U-PoT
generated code is compatible with gupnp library and can be
compiled and linked with gupnp to create an executable for
the U-PoT emulated device. Automating the code generation
for device actions makes the framework device type/vendor
agnostic and one can emulate any UPnP device as long as
they have access to the device/service description files.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the U-
PoT framework. We use U-PoT’s ability to create an emulated
device from unknown UPnP device description as the primary
evaluation criteria. We also make a comparative analysis of
the response time between a real physical device and the U-
PoT emulated device. Finally, we perform scalability analysis
to evaluate the average response time of the emulated device
under varying number of device deployments. With these, in
the evaluation, our goal was to answer the following questions:
• Can a U-PoT emulate a real physical device and fool
Fig. 7: Multiple U-PoT emulated device (smart switches) setup
in a single virtual machine.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 8: Comparison of response time between the physical and
emulated devices: (a) requests are sent from an Android based
control device; and, (b) requests are sent from the Computer.
a real device control/management application (i.e., the
accompanying vendor-provided Smartphone App)?
• Can a U-PoT emulated device serve client requests
within a reasonable response time?
• Can the U-PoT framework deploy large number of
emulated devices with minimal overhead (i.e., scala-
bility)?
A. Emulate a Physical Device
We evaluate U-PoT’s ability to mimic a real physical
device with the help of a vendor provided device management
application and the open Home Automation Bus (openHAB)
[16] framework. openHAB is a very popular, open-source,
technology-agnostic home automation platform. It integrates
different home automation systems, devices, and technologies
into a single solution. It provides uniform user interfaces, and a
common approach to automation rules across the entire system,
regardless of the number of manufacturers and sub-systems
involved. The basic building blocks of openHAB are many
plugins for different types of devices from different manufac-
turers. The plugins are called binding. For our evaluation, we
installed openHAB with two different bindings for our target
devices. Next, we evaluated U-PoT’s ability to mimic physical
device with the following two scenarios.
Case 1: Emulate a Known Physical Device: We config-
ured U-PoT to create an emulated version of Belkin WeMo
switch that we have used for the development of the U-PoT
framework. The instance of the Belkin WeMo switch was
deployed in a virtual machine. The WeMo device management
Android application was able to recognize the emulated IoT
device. The application was unaware that the device listed by
it is just an emulated device, not a real IoT physical device.
We were able to operate the application to send requests to the
emulated device and receive response from it. To further evalu-
ate it, we installed OpenHAB framework with WeMo binding.
OpenHAB was also able to recognize our emulate device as an
WeMo switch. To strengthen the evaluation, we deployed our
emulated WeMo device on a Linode server running Ubuntu-
16.04 and searched the server IP address in IoT search engine
Shodan [22] and it was listed as an UPnP device. This analysis
shows that, the U-PoT framework can successfully create an
emulated IoT device from the device description of an UPnP-
based IoT device and the emulated device can fool a real
vendor provided control application as well as popular IoT
search engines used by research community.
Case 2: Emulate an Unknown Physical Device: The
target of the U-PoT framework is to emulate any UPnP device
from its device description. To evaluate that, we selected
Samsung Smart TV as our second device of choice. This
device was not used for the implementation of the UPoT
framework and the framework was totally unaware of the
service descriptors of the device. Using the U-PoT framework,
we were able to generate the GUPnP API based code for
emulated device. We compiled the generated code against
GUPnP library and deployed it in a virtual machine. Next, we
installed Samsung Smart TV binding in OpenHAB framework.
OpenHAB framework was able to recognize our emulated
device as a Samsung Smart TV thus proving U-PoT’s ability
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 9: Change in response time with increased number of honeypots: (a) Android-to-emulated device communication for
concurrent requests to all the emulated IoT devices; (b) computer-to-emulated device communication for concurrent requests
to all the emulated IoT devices; (c) Android-to-emulated device communication for concurrent requests to a subset (5) of the
emulated IoT devices; and, (d) computer-to-emulated device communication for concurrent requests to a subset (5) of the emulated
IoT devices.
in creating emulated device from an unknown UPnP device’s
description.
B. Response Time Analysis
In this sub-section we perform a comparative analysis of
our emulated device with respect to a real device. This analysis
is useful to find out how closely U-PoT emulated device can
mimic a real physical device. We leave session time and data
capture performance as a future research.
Experimental Setup: We configured U-PoT to create mul-
tiple emulated version of Belkin WeMo switch and deployed
instances of the emulated switches in our test environment as
shown in Figure 7. The test environment was created with
a VirtualBox virtual machine with 1 CPU and 2GB RAM
running on a Windows 10 host machine. The virtual machine
was used to sandbox U-PoT emulated device environment
from the host physical environment. The virtual machine
was running Ubuntu-16.04 and configured with the bridge
networking setting. In an actual physical environment, each
device is assigned a different IP address. We created a shell
script to automatically create multiple virtual interfaces on the
virtual machine. Each virtual interface receives an IP address
from a DHCP server located on the router. We bound an
emulated device to each of this virtual interface’s IP address.
This flexible and configurable setup allowed us to deploy
a large collection of U-PoT device within a single virtual
environment with minimal effort.
Analysis Result: Figure 8(a) and 8(b) show a comparison
of the response time for both physical and U-PoT emulated IoT
device when 10 UPnP actions are invoked from an Android
device and computer, respectively. As shown in the figure, the
response times for emulated devices are faster than the physical
devices. This is because of the fact that the physical device
has limited processing capability in terms of hardware used.
On the other hand, U-PoT emulated IoT device is running
on a laptop with faster processing power. Though it seems
that an attacker can use the response time to differentiate a
honeypot from a real system, in a real deployment scenario,
the response time depends on different factors such as network
bandwidth, client’s processing power etc.; and, hence, merely
using response time as a differentiating factor is not enough.
Furthermore, a response time can be superficially inflated
depending on the deployment settings.
Scalability Analysis: To demonstrate the scalability of the
proposed system, we gradually increased the deployed number
of U-PoT instances and sent concurrent traffic to all of them
(Fig:9(a) & 9(b)) or a subset of them (Fig:9(c) & 9(d)). As
Figures 9(a) & 9(b) show, the maximum value of response
time increases within a reasonable limit with increased number
of U-PoT honeypots if there are concurrent requests to all the
honeypots. On the other hand, Figures 9(c) and 9(d) show that
for concurrent requests to a constant number of honeypots (5 in
our experiments); the maximum response time remains almost
constant. The response time is only affected by the U-PoT
devices that are serving client requests.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have introduced a novel open-source hon-
eypot framework for UPnP-based IoT devices called U-PoT.
U-PoT aims to solve the problems of existing low-interaction
honeypots while providing the advantages of high-interaction
honeypots. It is agnostic of device type or vendor, flexible, and
easily configurable for any UPnP-based devices. Specifically,
we developed and introduced the architecture of U-PoT as a
deploy-ready honeypot for UPnP-based smart home devices.
In U-PoT, we also developed a mechanism to automatically
create the honeypot from device description documents of an
UPnP device (i.e., WeMo smart switch). Our evaluation shows
that U-PoT can emulate a real physical IoT device successfully
and can fool a real device management/control application
(i.e., actual vendor-supplied Smartphone App) provided by the
device vendor. Also, multiple instances of U-PoT IoT devices
can be deployed in a single computer with minimum overhead
on the response time. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first work to focus on the interactive nature of IoT
devices to provide a cheap, flexible, and configurable honeypot
framework for UPnP-based IoT devices. As a future work, we
intend to deploy U-PoT in a larger public network and evaluate
its average session time and data capture performance.
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